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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(g) 
and (j)« 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the 1987 version of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
"Immunity Act") is constitutional insofar as it limits recovery from the State of Utah and state 
entities to $250,000. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 11 and 24, attached hereto at Addendum 1. 
Sections 63-30-3, 63-30-2 and 63-30-34 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq. as they existed in January of 1989, attached hereto at Addendum 
2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs' filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants on August 7, 1991. 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, who were retained to represent Plaintiffs, were negligent in 
recommending to Plaintiffs that they settle certain claims against the University Hospital for 
$250,000. (R. 7, Comp. 117). 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., §63-30-34 (1987) limited Plaintiffs' potential recovery against 
the University Hospital to $250,000, and that as a result, the Defendants' conduct in 
recommending settlement was reasonable, as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs' suffered no 
damages recoverable against Defendants. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, by Order dated April 14, 1992, denied Defendants' motions. 
(R. 726). 
Defendants filed a Joint Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with this 
Court on April 28, 1992. The Court granted the Petition by Order dated June 23, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 13, 1988, Plaintiff Shelly Hipwell entered McKay-Dee Hospital 
to give birth to her second child by caesarean section. (R. 4, Comp. 18). Because of the high-
risk nature of her condition, she was subsequently transferred to the University of Utah Medical 
Center. (R. 4, Comp. ]9).1 While at the University Hospital on January 18, 1989, Hipwell 
underwent a bone marrow draw. During the course of this procedure, Hipwell's heart was 
punctured and she sustained serious injuries and went into a coma. (R. 5, Comp. 110).2 
On or about February 10, 1989, Shelly Hipwell's mother, Sherry Jensen, and her 
husband, Shayne Hipwell, retained Defendant Roger T. Sharp to represent them with respect to 
any potential claims against all potentially culpable parties. (R. 5-6, Comp. 113). Defendant 
Sharp subsequently associated Defendant Tim W. Healy as co-counsel. (R. 5-6, Comp. 113). 
Hipwell's mother and husband were duly appointed as her co-guardians. (R. 3, Comp. 112 and 
3). 
lThe University Medical Center houses the University of Utah College of Medicine, the College of Nursing, 
and the College of Pharmacy, which are departments of the University of Utah. The University Medical Center also 
houses the University of Utah Hospital, which has a separate organizational structure, but is organized under the 
authority of and constitutes a part of the University of Utah. These entities are collectively referred to herein as 
the "University Hospital." (Affidavit of Walter Stevens, Ph.D., \2, R. 289-290). 
2Shelly Hipwell died on May 27, 1992 (R. 728). 
2 
Defendants negotiated a $250,000 settlement proposal with counsel for the University 
Hospital and on May 15, 1989, a Verified Petition for Court Approval of Settlement, and for 
Authority to Disburse Funds was filed in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, 
State of Utah, Probate No. 893917059CG. The petition was executed by both Shayne Hipwell 
and Sherry Jensen. (R. 222-228). That same day, Defendants and Plaintiffs appeared before 
the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor regarding the petition. Shortly thereafter, Judge Taylor 
entered the Order Approving Settlement and for Authority to Disburse Funds. In the order, 
Judge Taylor stated: 
It appears to the Court that the offer . . . to pay the sum of 
$250,000.00 . . . is fair and reasonable. 
(R. 232). 
Plaintiffs, after receiving the benefit of the settlement for more than two years, 
commenced this legal malpractice action on August 7, 1991. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have sued Defendants for legal malpractice arising out of Defendants' alleged 
breach of the standard of care in recommending to Plaintiffs that they settle potential claims 
against the University Hospital for $250,000. Plaintiffs' cannot state a claim for relief against 
Defendants because an attorney can only be liable for legal malpractice if his conduct 
proximately causes the former client to suffer damages. Under the clear language of the version 
of the Immunity Act in effect in January of 1989 when Plaintiffs' claims against the University 
Hospital arose, recovery from all governmental entities for conduct for which governmental 
3 
immunity has been waived is limited to $250,000 for one person and $500,000 for two or more 
persons in any one occurrence.3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs' potential recovery against the 
University Hospital was limited to $250,000, and as a result, Defendants conduct cannot, as a 
matter of law, be found to be the proximate cause of any damages suffered by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of the recovery limitation under the "open 
courts" provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, the equal protection provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution, the due process provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and 
this Court's decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
This Court's decision in Condemarin is not controlling because it did not address the 
1987 version of the Immunity Act. In addition, the basic premise supporting the analysis and 
conclusions reached by each member of the plurality in Condemarin is incorrect due to incorrect 
briefing by the parties, and as a result, the analysis used and the conclusions reached by the 
plurality are incorrect. 
In Condemarin. this Court held that the 1978 version of the Immunity Act treated 
governmentally-owned hospitals and health care facilities different from other governmental 
entities by enacting a recovery limitation for judgments arising from the proprietary conduct of 
such entities. The 1987 version of the Immunity Act materially changed governmental immunity 
in Utah because, under the 1987 version, the recovery limitation applies to judgments against 
all governmental entities for liability based on all conduct for which immunity has been waived, 
^Throughout this brief
 f the applicable version of the Immunity Act will be referred to as the "1987 version " as 
a result of significant amendments to the Immunity Act made in 1987. 
4 
proprietary and governmental. This material change addresses one of the classifications 
identified by the plurality in Condemarin and eliminates that classification as a basis for the 
conclusions reached by the plurality. 
In addition to the significant changes resulting from the 1987 amendments to the 
Immunity Act, the analysis used and the conclusions reached by the plurality in Condemarin are 
incorrect, and as a result, should not be followed in this case. In Condemarin. Justice Durham, 
Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart (collectively referred to as the "plurality") each based 
their analysis and conclusions on the premise that state entities did not enjoy immunity for 
proprietary conduct at common law. Based on this premise, the plurality members each 
determined that the recovery limitation of the 1978 version of the Immunity Act infringed upon 
rights protected by the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. Based upon this 
determination, Justice Durham and Justice Stewart both applied a heightened scrutiny standard 
in their respective equal protection analysis, and Justice Zimmerman did not apply the general 
presumption of constitutionality and shifted the burden of proof to the State in connection with 
his due process analysis. 
However, at common law, state entities did enjoy governmental immunity for all conduct, 
proprietary and governmental. In addition, prior Utah case law and case law from numerous 
other courts establish that "open courts" provisions only prevent the abolition of causes of action 
that were recognized at the time the applicable constitution was ratified. Because governmental 
immunity barred all causes of action against state entities at common law for damages resulting 
from proprietary conduct, "open courts" provisions cannot be used to invalidate statutes which 
retain original immunities. Because "open courts" provisions do not apply, the general 
5 
presumption of constitutionality, the general burden of proof and the minimum scrutiny standard 
are applicable. 
Courts have uniformly recognized that the legislature has the authority and power with 
respect to governmental immunity. Legislative enactments generally, and governmental 
immunity statutes specifically, enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and should not 
be declared unconstitutional unless the party challenging the statute proves that it is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Applying these general principles to the 1987 version of the Immunity Act, this Court 
should find that the recovery limitation is constitutional as a reasonable and rational means for 
achieving the legislative purpose behind governmental immunity, i.e., protecting the public 
coffers from unforeseen and unexpected damage awards and allowing for fiscal certainty in 
carrying out the expanding responsibilities of government. Based on this conclusion, the Court 
should find that Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim for relief against Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS SHOULD 
BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE IMMUNITY ACT LIMITED 
PLAINTIFFS' RECOVERY FROM THE UNIVERSITY 
HOSPITAL TO $250.000, 
A. Plaintiffs Must Establish Damages Proximately Caused by Defendants' Breach of 
the Standard of Care in Order to Recover on Their Legal Malpractice Claim. 
The following are the essential elements of a legal malpractice claim in Utah: 
1. an attorney/client relationship; 
2. a duty of the attorney to the client; 
3. a breach of the duty; and 
6 
4. damages suffered by the client and proximately caused by 
the attorney's breach of the duty. 
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988); see also, Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 
799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, the essence of Plaintiffs' claim is that Defendants, in various ways, breached 
the standard of care by recommending that Plaintiffs settle their claims against the University 
Hospital for $250,000. To establish their claim, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants breached 
the standard of care by recommending the settlement. In addition, Plaintiffs must show that had 
they pursued their claims against the University Hospital, they would have recovered in excess 
of $250,000. The leading treatise on legal malpractice has explained this concept of proximate 
cause as follows: 
[T|he plaintiff must establish that the attorney's negligence 
proximately caused the loss of a valid and collectible claim. Thus, 
the attorney's failure to prosecute a lawsuit cannot be the 
proximate cause of a loss if the client did not have a viable cause 
of action. 
R. Mallen and J. Smith, Legal Malpractice (3d Ed. 1989) Vol. 2, §24.14 at pp. 487-88 
(emphasis added). 
This Court has applied this same rule of proximate cause in several legal malpractice 
cases. In Young v. Bridwell. 437 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1968), the Court stated: 
(T]n order to make out a cause of action against the attorney for 
failing to advise of their right to appeal, it would have to be shown 
that there was at least a reasonable likelihood of reversing the 
judgment and that it would have benefitted the plaintiff. 
In Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurray & Thurman. 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978), this 
Court was asked to determine whether the trial court was correct in granting the defendants' 
7 
motion for directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action 
because she had shown no damages proximately caused by the attorney's conduct. This Court 
affirmed the trial court, finding that there was no evidence that the attorney's conduct was the 
proximate cause of any damages. Id. at 897. 
The proximate cause rule was most recently followed in Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 
887 (Utah 1988). There, this Court held that the element of proximate cause requires an 
assessment of the merits of the underlying action, and stated: 
When an attorney breaches such a duty, he is liable for all 
damages directly and proximately caused by his act or failure to 
act. Generally speaking, incurring liability through a breach of 
duty does not necessarily result in damages. The adoption fof such 
a rule] would require this Court to either ignore the requirement 
of proximate cause with respect to a finding of damages in tort or 
expand the concept of liability beyond its commonly held meaning. 
Id. p. 889 (emphasis added). 
Based upon these cases, it is clear that if Plaintiffs' recovery from the University Hospital 
were limited to $250,000, Plaintiffs cannot establish the proximate cause element of their claims 
against the Defendants. 
B. The 1987 Version of the Immunity Act Limited Plaintiffs' Recovery from the 
University Hospital to $250.000. 
Plaintiffs' claims against the University Hospital arose in January of 1989, and are 
therefore governed by the version of the Immunity Act in effect at that time. At that time, the 
clear language of the Immunity Act limited the recoverable damages from all governmental 
entities, including the University Hospital, for all conduct for which governmental immunity was 
waived to $250,000. The Immunity Act stated, in pertinent part: 
8 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1985). 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political 
subdivisions as defined in this chapter. 
(4)(a) "Governmental Function" means any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity 
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual 
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or 
government function, or could be performed by private enterprise 
or private persons. 
(9) "State" means the State of Utah, and includes any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, 
or other instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2 (1987). 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for 
damages for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an 
employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, 
exceeds $250,000 for one person . . ., the court shall reduce the 
judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34 (1987). 
From these provisions, it is clear that the University Hospital is a "governmental entity," 
that all conduct of the University Hospital is deemed to be a "governmental function" and that 
recovery from governmental entities is limited, under all circumstances where complete 
immunity does not exist, to $250,000. Accordingly, unless the recovery limitation is 
constitutionally infirm as applied to the University Hospital, Plaintiffs' recovery against the 
9 
University Hospital was limited to $250,000, and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants 
negligently recommended a $250,000 settlement must fail as a matter of law. 
H. THE HISTORY OF STATE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND 
THE IMMUNITY ACT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE STATE AND 
STATE ENnTIES ENJOYED COMPLETE IMMUNITY AT COMMON 
LAW, AND THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE AUTHORITY 
TO LIMIT RECOVERY FROM GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. 
A, Prior to the Enactment of the Immunity Act, the State and State Entities Were 
Immune from all Liability Unless Expressly Waived by the Legislature. 
A line of prior decisions of this Court establishes that (1) the State of Utah and all state 
entities were immune from all tort liability at common law; and (2) the Legislature has the sole 
authority for making state entities respond in damages. In Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626 (Utah 
1913), the plaintiff sued the State, the State Engineer, and the State Board of Land 
Commissioners for damages to his land and crops caused by the State's construction of an 
irrigation reservoir and canal. The defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint which was 
denied. Defendants then appealed, asserting the doctrine of governmental immunity. In 
reversing the trial court, the Court stated: 
[Tjn the absence of either express constitutional or statutory 
authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained, 
The doctrine is elementary and of universal application, and so far 
as we are aware there is not a single authority to the contrary. 
Id. at 630; see also, Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Comm'n.. 70 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 
1937) ("action may not be maintained [against the State Road Commission] unless the State has, 
through legislative or constitutional action, given consent to be sued;" "[S]uit against the State 
may not be maintained for negligence or tort because no authorization for such is found in the 
statutes"); State v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) (the State Road Commission 
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is an agency of the State and "the state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has 
waived immunity"); Bingham v. Board of Education. 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) ("while 
law writers, editors and judges have criticized and disapproved the foregoing doctrine of 
governmental immunity as illogical and unjust, the weight of precedent of decided cases supports 
the general rule and we prefer not to disregard a principle so well established without statutory 
authority;" "under our constitution, the power to make departments of the state respond in 
damages for torts rests with the legislature, and without legislative enactment we are unable to 
impose any liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]"). 
From these cases, it is clear that in Utah, the State and all state entities are, and have 
always been, immune from all liability unless the Legislature has given its consent or waived 
immunity. 
B. Prior to the Enactment of the Immunity Act. Municipalities Enjoyed 
Immunity Only for Governmental Functions. 
Although the State of Utah and all state entities enjoyed immunity for all conduct at 
common law, the same is not true for municipalities. 
Municipal corporations do not fully partake of the state's immunity 
because of their peculiar nature. They are on the one hand 
subdivisions of the state exercising governmental powers, but on 
the other hand they engage in activities similar to those of private 
corporations. Because of this dual character, the immunity of the 
state is extended to the municipality only when it acts in a 
governmental capacity. Where the municipal corporation acts in 
a private corporate capacity, it is liable for its torts. This rule of 
law seems to be uniform throughout the country. 
Note, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37 (1956) (emphasis 
added); see also, Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976) ("prior to 1965, 
actions for negligence could not have been maintained against the State or its political 
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subdivisions for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any road or 
bridge except municipalitiesM); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) 
(recognizing dual character of municipal corporations and different application of immunity as 
a result of dual character). 
This Court most recently recognized this distinction in Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) when it stated: 
In the past, public entities at the State and county levels had a 
greater immunity than did those at the municipal level. However, 
we note, without deciding, that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act casts serious doubt on the viability of this distinction because 
the Act does not differentiate between the State and its political 
subdivisions. 
Id. at 1233 n.3.4 
Accordingly, at common law, there was a significant difference between the immunity 
afforded the State and the immunity afforded municipalities. Municipalities enjoyed immunity 
only for conduct performed in the exercise of a governmental function while the State and state 
entities enjoyed immunity for all conduct. 
C. The Immunity Act Arguably Eliminated the Distinction Between the State and 
Municipalities. 
In 1965, the Legislature enacted the original version of the Immunity Act. When 
enacted, §63-30-3 arguably eliminated the distinction between the State and municipalities and 
4In Standiford. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), this Court extensively reviewed the case law concerning the 
proprietary/governmental distinction. Every Utah case cited by the Court in Standiford concerning the distinction 
involved a municipality, and counsel for Healy have been unable to find a single pre-Immunity Act Utah case 
involving the State or a state entity that considered the proprietary/governmental distinction. 
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also arguably eliminated the State's immunity for non-governmental, proprietary functions.5 
Section 63-30-3 read: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in the act, all governmental 
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result 
from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged 
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1965).6 
Accordingly, although the State and state entities had previously enjoyed tort immunity 
for all conduct, proprietary and governmental, the 1965 enactment of the Immunity Act arguably 
waived immunity for liability arising from the performance of non-governmental functions. In 
explaining the status of the law at that time, this Court stated: 
Under that framework, the right to maintain an action against the 
state or its political subdivisions can result (1) from a finding that 
the injury did not result from the exercise of a governmental 
function, or (2) from a finding that even though the injury resulted 
from the exercise of a governmental function, the government's 
immunity has been expressly waived in one of the sections of the 
Act. 
Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627, 630 (Utah 1983).7 
Because the State and state entities were immune for all conduct prior to the enactment of the Immunity Act, 
it is reasonable to assume that the drafters of the Immunity Act intended to retain the common law immunity for the 
State and state entities subject only to specified waivers. Section A. 2 of the Brief of Appellant Roger Sharp more 
fully addresses this alternative reading of the 1965 Immunity Act. 
6Section 63-30-2(2)(1965) defined the term "governmental entity" to mean the state and its "political 
subdivisions," section 63-30-2(l)(1965) defined the term "state" to mean "the State of Utah or any office, 
department,. . . hospital,. . .," and section 63-30-2(3)(1965) defined the term "political subdivision" to mean "any 
county, city, town, . . ." 
Recovery for liability under the second category was limited to sums that were available from insurance 
coverage purchased by governmental entities, subject to certain minimum insurance requirements. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-29 and 63-30-34 (1965). The minimum limits were $100,000 for one person and $300,000 for two or more 
persons. 
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D. The 1978 Amendments to the Immunity Act Reinstated the State's 
Immunity From Suits Arising from the Operation of Governmentally-Owned 
Hospitals. 
In 1978, the Legislature amended §63-30-3 to reinstate immunity from suits for injury 
arising from the operation of governmentally-owned hospitals. Section 63-30-3 was amended 
to read: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility. 
(Emphasis added). 
After the 1978 amendments, this Court, in two separate decisions, recognized and held 
that if the Legislature includes governmentally-owned health care facilities among immune 
entities in §63-30-3, then those entities are entitled to immunity. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court stated: 
Subsequent to the decision rendered in Greenhalgh v. 
Payson City, supra, §63-30-3 was amended to specifically exempt 
governmentally-owned hospitals . . . . To the extent that the 
Payson City hospital is now covered by §63-30-3, the holding in 
Greenhalgh has been legislatively overruled. 
Id. at 1232 n.2. 
In Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), this Court was called upon to determine 
whether the immunity granted to the University of Utah Medical Center through the 1978 
amendment should have retroactive application. The Court stated: 
The Utah legislature resolved the health care classification 
question in 1978 by an amendment to the [Immunity Act], 
whereunder governmental entities are granted immunity from suit 
for injury relating to the public ownership and operation of a 
hospital, nursing home, or other health care facility. While the 
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amended reenactment of the provision in question was not made 
expressly retroactive, and the present action arose prior to its 
passage, we are disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to 
disregard the obvious manifestation of legislative intent reflected 
in the amendment, for this reason, we hold the operation of a 
governmentally-owned health care facility such as the University 
Medical Center to be a 'governmental function' as contemplated by 
statute prior to amendment. 
Id. at 519 (citations omitted). 
In 1989, for reasons that will be discussed in detail below, this Court departed from the 
basic premise established by the common law and concluded that the 1978 amendments "created" 
immunity for governmentally-owned hospitals that in conjunction with the recovery limitation 
statute operated to deprive plaintiffs of rights they held at common law. Condemarin v, 
University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
E. The 1987 Amendments to the Immunity Act Reinstated Immunity for all 
Governmental Entities for Proprietary Conduct. 
In 1987, after all of the appellate briefs in Condemarin had been submitted to the Court, 
the Immunity Act was amended to include all activities of governmental entities, including the 
activities of the University Hospital, within the definition of "governmental function:" 
(4)(a) "Governmental Function" means any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity 
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual 
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or 
government function, or could be performed by private enterprise 
or private persons. 
(3) "Government Entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined 
in this chapter. 
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(9) "State" means the State of Utah, and includes any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, 
or other instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2 (1987) (emphasis added). 
The effect of these amendments is to reinstate immunity for state entities for all conduct, 
including proprietary conduct. This Court did not consider the constitutionality of the 1987 
amendments to the Immunity Act in Condemarin.8 
F. This Court Has Always Recognized that the Legislature Has Sole Authority to 
Determine the Scope and Breadth of Immunity. 
Both before and after the Immunity Act, this Court recognized that the Legislature has 
the sole right, absent delegation to the courts, to determine the scope and breadth of any waiver 
of governmental immunity. In Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 70 P.2d 857, 862 
(Utah 1937), this Court stated: 
[W]hen there is statutory consent to sue, the statute is the measure 
of the power to sue. 
Id. at 862 (emphasis added); see also, Campbell v. Pack. 389 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1964) ("It 
should be left entirely to the legislature to determine whether the immunity should be removed, 
and as to what agencies; when effective, and to what extent, if any, limitations should be 
prescribed"). 
Even during the time period between 1965 and 1978, when the courts were given the 
responsibility for determining what did and what did not constitute a "governmental function," 
^Justice Stewart did refer to the increase in the amount of the recovery limitation from $100,000 to $250,000 
at footnote 1 on page 370. However, he did not address the overall changes made by the 1987 amendments. 
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this Court continued to recognize that it is the Legislature that controls the existence of 
immunity. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court stated: 
(TJhe Legislature designed this statutory scheme to allow the 
courts flexibility and adaptability in fashioning consistent and 
rational limits to governmental immunity. To that end, the 
Legislature intended the courts to have the power to restrict the 
scope of governmental immunity. 
Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), the 
Court stated: 
[The Immunity Act] significantly altered the common law of 
sovereign immunity, and substituted a statutory framework to be 
interpreted by the courts and reshaped by the Legislature as 
necessary from time to time. 
Id. at 629-30 (emphasis added). 
The ultimate proof of the Legislature's authority in this area was reflected in Standiford 
when the Court stated that the legislative amendment to §63-30-3, adding governmental health 
care facilities to the definition of governmental function, "legislatively overruled" an earlier 
Utah Supreme Court decision in which a city hospital was found to be subject to suit. Id. at 
1232 n.2. 
Finally, even in holding some aspects of the 1978 version of the Immunity Act 
unconstitutional, Justice Durham's opinion in Condemarin still recognized that the Legislature 
controls the area of governmental immunity. 
We now observe, however, that the legislature did not make the 
operation of a health care facility a "'government function' as 
contemplated by statute," as the Court said in Frank. Rather, the 
legislature simply added to the category of government entities 
covered by section 63-30-3 . . . 
Id. at 351 (emphasis by court). 
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Accordingly, although the Legislature has from time-to-time delegated to the courts the 
authority and responsibility for determining the scope and breadth of governmental immunity, 
the Legislature has always been recognized as the branch of government with the power and 
responsibility for determining the scope and breadth of governmental immunity. 
HI. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CONDEMARIN DOES NOT ADDRESS 
THE 1987 AMENDMENTS AND SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED IN 
ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN THLS CASE. 
The plaintiff in Condemarin sustained her injury in 1982. At that time, the 1978 version 
of the Immunity Act was in effect. Shortly after her injury, the Condemarin plaintiff filed suit 
and moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied, and the plaintiff then petitioned for 
and was granted an interlocutory appeal before this Court. In deciding Condemarin. the Justices 
of this Court issued four separate opinions: a plurality opinion authored by Justice Durham, a 
concurring opinion authored by Justice Zimmerman, a concurring opinion authored by Justice 
Stewart, and a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Hall and joined by Justice Howe. Because 
none of the opinions mention the 1987 amendments, it is clear that the Condemarin decision 
did not address the issues raised by this appeal. 
A. The Basic Premise Underlying the Court's Constitutional Analysis in Condemarin 
is Incorrect. 
Although the Condemarin decision does not apply to the 1987 version of the Immunity 
Act, Plaintiffs have taken the position that the analysis adopted by the plurality in Condemarin, 
if followed in this case, would result in the 1987 version being held unconstitutional. However, 
because the basic premise underlying the decision in Condemarin is incorrect, the Court's 
analysis and conclusion are also flawed and should not be followed. 
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In Condemarin. this Court found that the recovery limitation, as it applied to the 
University Hospital, was unconstitutional. However, in order to understand the basis for this 
seemingly simple conclusion, careful examination of the various opinions is necessary. First, 
Justice Hall and Justice Howe dissented, finding the recovery limitation constitutional. In 
writing the plurality opinion, Justice Durham found both equal protection and due process 
reasons for holding the recovery limitation unconstitutional. 775 P.2d at 352-64. In a separate 
concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman joined only in Justice Durham's due process analysis. 
Id. at 366. Justice Stewart found the due process analysis inapplicable, but joined with Justice 
Durham on equal protection grounds. Id. at 369. 
The basic underlying premise to the analysis used and the conclusions reached by Justice 
Durham, Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart is that at common law, the State and state 
entities were not immune for liability arising out of the performance of proprietary or non-
governmental functions.9 Justice Durham wrote that "at common law the proprietary or non-
The origin of the plurality's incorrect finding that state entities did not enjoy immunity for proprietary conduct 
at common law is clearly the parties7 failure to recognize and address the issue. The brief submitted by the 
University Hospital erroneously assumed that state entities and municipalities enjoyed the same immunity at common 
law: 
Under [the] common law there was always discrimination between a person 
injured by a state employee functioning in a government capacity and one 
injured by a state employee functioning in a proprietary capacity. Under 
sovereign immunity the person injured in the governmental function was 
absolutely barred from any recovery whereas a complete recovery was possible 
as to the proprietary function. 
* * * 
Since government entities were immune from suit for government activities the 
important distinction as to the liability of the entity itself was whether the 
function was proprietary or governmental. 
Appellate Brief of University Hospital, pp. 35 and 41. 
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governmental functions of governmental entities were not protected from liability in Utah." Id. 
at 351. 
In addition, in analyzing the 1978 amendments, Justice Durham described the addition 
of the health care language as follows: 
The net result of this classification scheme is that the state, 
while choosing to conduct many enterprises that are not essential 
and necessary to governing, has chosen to retain immunity for only 
one of those activities-health care services-and to extend that 
immunity to its employees who function at an operational level 
rather than at a policy-making one. In doing so. the state has 
extended governmental immunity further than it ever reached at 
common law and, in the process, has abrogated a well-established 
common law right of recovery. 
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). Justice Durham's statement is correct to the extent she is referring 
to proprietary functions performed by non-state health care facilities, because such facilities, like 
all other non-state entities, did not enjoy immunity at common law. However, as is set forth 
above, state health care facilities did enjoy immunity at common law for all conduct, proprietary 
and governmental. As a result, the express inclusion of state health care facilities in the 1978 
amendments was, indeed, a retention or at least a reinstatement of an original immunity.10 
The importance of this incorrect premise to Justice Durham's analysis and ultimate 
conclusion is reflected by her statement that she would impose a heightened standard of review 
under equal protection because "the legislature has not only limited recovery, but it has also 
extended partial governmental immunity to restrict rights which existed at common law." Id. 
l0This retention, or reinstatement, was reiterated again in the 1987 amendments when the legislature broadened 
the definition of "governmental function." 
20 
at 356. Similarly, the importance of this incorrect premise was reflected in Justice Durham's 
due process analysis when she framed the issue as follows: 
The determinative question is therefore whether the recovery cap 
can be regarded as a reasonable, non-arbitrary limitation on the 
right to recover for tortious injuries in a context where a common 
law right to recovery has been restricted. 
Id. at 361. 
The incorrect premise also played a significant role in Justice Zimmerman's analysis and 
determination. In explaining why he believes that the burden of proof should shift to the State, 
Justice Zimmerman refers to the legislation as "severely restricting] the right of every person 
to recover . . . " Id. at 368. In addition, in concluding that the State failed to meet its burden, 
Justice Zimmerman refers to the legislation as "having abridged the important right of citizens 
to recover . . . " Id. at 368-69. 
Justice Stewart also incorporated this incorrect premise in framing the issue for his equal 
protection analysis. 
[T]he issue that emerges is whether the Legislature ran afoul of 
Article I, section 24 of the . . . Utah Constitution by limiting the 
liability of an institution owned by government which performs 
nongovernmental activities. 
Id. at 372 (emphasis by court). 
From these statements it is clear that the plurality each based their respective analysis 
upon the incorrect premise that state owned hospitals did not enjoy immunity for non-
governmental functions at common law. 
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B. Based on this Incorrect Premise, the Plurality Each Incorrectly Chose to Apply 
a Heightened Scrutiny Standard in Their Constitutional Analysis. 
The net result of the use of the incorrect premise is that Justice Durham, Justice 
Zimmerman and Justice Stewart each applied a heightened standard of scrutiny in their 
respective equal protection and due process analysis. The justification for the heightened 
scrutiny in each opinion is the purported violation of a constitutional right protected by Article 
1, Section 11 by limiting recovery for a cause of action available at common law. Id. at 358 
(Justice Durham -"Because of the constitutional status of the right to a remedy for damage to 
one's person under article I, section 11, more (a heightened standard) is required"); Id. at 368 
(Justice Zimmerman - "Because the interests at stake are specifically protected by the 
constitution, the presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative action must be 
reversed once it is shown that the enactment under scrutiny does, in fact, infringe upon the 
interests enumerated in Article I, Section 11"); Id. at 372-373 (Justice Stewart - "The right 
involved here is the right to a full remedy for a personal injury, a right protected by Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution"; "The appropriate standard, in my view, has more bite than 
the minimum scrutiny standard..."). 
However, as set forth above, because there was no right to sue a state-owned hospital 
for damages arising out of the performance of non-governmental functions at common law, the 
reinstatement of immunity for such liability does not infringe upon the rights protected by Article 
I, Section 11. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, commonly referred to as the "open courts" 
provision, states: 
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All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay . . . 
This and similar provisions found in the constitutions of other states are frequently relied upon 
by plaintiffs in an attempt to have governmental immunity statutes declared unconstitutional. 
However, this argument has almost been universally rejected because "open courts" provisions 
only guarantee access to those remedies that existed at the time a state constitution was ratified 
and, as no remedy against state entities whatsoever existed at the time of the ratification of the 
constitutions because of the doctrine of governmental immunity, "open courts" provisions do not 
apply. 
This Court previously stated that the "open courts" provision does not affect the law of 
governmental immunity in Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). There, the plaintiffs 
filed suit against the State of Utah and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, alleging that 
the defendants failed to fulfill their statutory obligation of supervising banks and financial 
institutions. The plaintiffs further alleged that as a result of the defendants negligence the 
plaintiffs lost substantial amounts of money when the financial institution in which they had 
deposited money became insolvent. 
The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by the Immunity 
Act. The trial court dismissed the action and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the plaintiffs 
argued that statutory and common law governmental immunity was unconstitutional under the 
"open courts" provision. This Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that the "open 
courts" provision had no effect on the principle of sovereign immunity. 
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Sovereign immunity — the principle that the state cannot be 
sued in its own courts without its consent — was a well-settled 
principle of American common law at the time Utah became a 
state. Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which 
prescribes that all courts shall be open and persons shall not be 
barred from using them to redress injuries, was not meant to create 
a new remedy or a new right of action. Consequently, Article I, 
section 11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign 
immunity, and sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under 
that section. 
Id- at 629 (citations omitted). 
This principle was also explained in Brown v. Wightman. 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915). 
There, the plaintiff sued for wrongful death. However, because wrongful death actions did not 
exist at common law, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the dismissal 
violated the "open courts" provision. In rejecting this argument, this Court said: 
[The "open courts" provision] is a general provision, which in the 
same or similar language will be found in the constitutions of at 
least 28 states in the union . . . . The courts have, however, 
always considered and treated those provisions, not as creating 
new rights, or as giving new remedies where none otherwise are 
given, but as placing a limitation upon the legislature to prevent 
that branch of government from closing the doors of the courts 
against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in 
accordance with some known remedy. Where no right of action 
is given, however, or no remedy exists, under either the common 
law or some statute, those constitutional provisions create none. 
. . . The right and power, as well as the duty, of creating rights 
and to provide remedies, lies with the legislature, and not with the 
courts. Courts can only protect and enforce existing rights, and 
they may do that only in accordance with established and known 
remedies. 
Id. at 366-67. 
From these cases it is clear that in Utah, the "open courts" provision applies only to 
rights and remedies that existed at the time the constitution was ratified. 
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Other courts have applied this same rule of law to challenges to governmental immunity 
statutes. In Brown v. Wichita State Univ.. 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976), cited with approval by 
this Court in Madsen. supra. 658 P.2d at 629, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 
a statute reinstating governmental immunity under an "open courts" provision similar to that 
found in the Utah Constitution. The Kansas provision stated: 
All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered 
without delay. 
Id. at 1023 (quoting Section 18 of Kansas Bill of Rights). The plaintiffs claimed that the state 
governmental immunity statutes denied them a remedy against Wichita State University arising 
out of a crash of an airplane carrying the university's football team in violation of this 
constitutional provision. In Kansas, the doctrine of governmental immunity was judicially 
abrogated in 1970. Subsequently, the legislature enacted a comprehensive governmental 
immunity act. The plaintiffs challenged the governmental immunity statutes as violating 
principles of equal protection as well as Kansas' "open courts" provision. In rejecting the 
plaintiffs' argument and upholding the governmental immunity statute, the court stated: 
[The "open courts" provision] does not create any new 
rights, but merely recognizes long established systems of law 
existing prior to the adoption of the constitution. Since the right 
to sue the state for torts was a right denied at common law, such 
right is not protected by Section 18 . . . . It seems unlikely that 
the framers of our constitution intended Section 18 to abrogate 
governmental immunity. Were this true, our early court decisions 
would have reached that result. Instead, our prior decisions 
uphold governmental immunity. 
Id. at 1023. 
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The same argument was made and rejected in Martinez v. Harris County. 808 S.W.2d 
257 (Tex. App. 1991), under a constitutional provision stating that, "all courts shall be open, 
and every person for an injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law." Id. at 261 (quoting Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 11). 
In upholding the constitutionality of the governmental immunity statutes, the court stated: 
[TJn order for the open courts analysis to apply, there must be 
some abrogation of a litigant's right to bring a cause of action, 
either common law or statutory . . . . 
* * * 
[Plaintiff] did not have a common law cause of action for 
suit against Harris County; he only had a right to sue the county 
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Under the common law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity the state and its political 
subdivisions, which includes counties, may not be held liable for 
torts absent a statutory provision creating such liability. The 
Texas Tort Claims Act provides the exception to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity for counties. Thus, [plaintiffs] remedy is not 
rooted in the common law, but is statutorily created. Because he 
cannot establish that he had a cognizable cause of action that was 
restricted by [the statute in question], he has failed to show a 
violation of the open courts provision of the constitution. 
Id.; see also, Morris v. Blake. 552 A.2d 844, 850 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (no cause of action 
existed against the county at common law and thus the "open courts" provision of the state 
constitution did not affect the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Hale v. Port of Portland. 783 
P.2d 506, 509-12 (Or. 1989) (sovereign immunity was firmly in place when the slate constitution 
was ratified; thus statute capping damages recoverable from state entities at $100,000 is not 
unconstitutional under "open courts" provision); Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 576 A.2d 306, 
309 (Pa. 1986) (framers of state constitution would have had no reason to apply "open courts" 
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provision to claims against government, as government was immune from suit); Gaspar v. 
Freidel. 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990) (the "open courts" provision of the state constitution is 
not violated when no remedy existed at common law); High-Grade Oil Co.. Inc. v. SommerT 
295 N.W.2d 736, 739 (S.D. 1980) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity predates the constitution 
and the "open courts" provision of the state constitution has no affect on state statutes imposing 
governmental immunity); Stout v. Grand Prairie Independent School Dist.. 733 S.W.2d 290,297 
(Tex. App. 1987) (the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity preceded the "open courts" 
provision of the state constitution and thus does not affect the constitutionality of the 
governmental immunity statutes). 
From the prior decisions of this Court and from the decisions of other courts throughout 
the country, it is clear that "open courts" provisions, such as that found at Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution, do not apply to rights and remedies that did not exist at the time the 
constitution was adopted. Because there was no right of action against a state owned hospital 
at common law, the partial reinstatement of immunity from such actions does not violate the 
"open courts" provision set forth at Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, 
this Court should not have applied a heightened standard of review in Condemarin. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE 1987 VERSION OF THE 
IMMUNITY ACT TO BE VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Condemarin. Justice Zimmerman reversed the usual presumption and shifted the 
burden of proof to the State based upon his conclusion that the Immunity Act infringed rights 
protected by the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. Because the premise 
underlying the reversal of the presumption and shifting of the burden is incorrect, as set forth 
in Section III, this Court should apply the general presumption and burden of proof. 
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This Court has repeatedly emphasized that legislative enactments carry a strong 
presumption of validity. In Ellis v. Social Services Dept.. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), this 
Court stated: 
There is a general reluctance on the part of the judiciary to declare 
a legislative enactment facially unconstitutional. All doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and no act 
should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and palpably 
so, A statute must be read to be consistent with basic 
constitutional rights, and will be upheld unless it contains a 
provision which expressly excludes a constitutional protection. 
Id. at 1255-56 (citations omitted); see also, State v. Murphy. 674 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983); 
Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974) ("it is the well established rule that 
legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that they should 
not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found 
to come within the constitutional framework; and that a statute will not be stricken down as 
being unconstitutional unless it appears to be so beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added). 
Additionally, the party attacking the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of 
proof. See, Utah Assoc. Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Common,. 789 P.2d 298, 
301 (Utah 1990); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184, 190-91 (Utah 1984) ("a 
party attacking the constitutionality of a statute must affirmatively demonstrate its 
unconstitutionality"). 
In accordance with these principles, the 1987 version of the Immunity Act is entitled to 
a strong presumption of validity, and must be given effect unless the Plaintiffs can prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that it is clearly and palpably unconstitutional. 
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V. THE PROVISION LIMITING RECOVERY FROM STATE-OWNED 
HOSPITALS TO $250.000 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION. 
A. The Court Should Apply the Minimum Scrutiny Standard in Reviewing the 
Recovery Limitation 
Principles of equal protection derive from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and from Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Because no fundamental 
right or suspect class is involved in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment only requires 
application of the minimum scrutiny standard, i.e., that the classification be rationally related 
to a valid public purpose. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 
1991). Although Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general 
fundamental purposes as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the test is 
somewhat more restrictive. Id. at 821. Under Article I, Section 24, "a law must apply equally 
to all persons within a class" and, "the statutory classification and the different treatment given 
the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives 
of the statute. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
Numerous courts from other states have addressed the equal protection argument as it 
relates to recovery limitations applicable to governmental entities. The Colorado Supreme Court 
addressed the issue in Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health. 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986)(en banc). 
There, an injured driver, his wife and their five children filed suit against a state agency and its 
employees for injuries sustained by the driver as a result of an automobile collision. The case 
was tried to a jury. The jury apportioned fault, 49% to the plaintiffs and 51 % to the defendants, 
and found that the driver sustained total damages of $606,409.38, the driver's wife sustained 
damages on her claim of loss of consortium of $100,000, and that each of the children sustained 
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damages of $10,000. After trial, the trial court entered judgment, limiting the amount of the 
driver's recovery to $150,000 pursuant to a Colorado statute that limits the maximum amount 
of judgment recoverable against all public entities and their employees to $150,000 for any 
injury to one person and $400,000 for injuries to two or more persons in a single occurrence. 
Id. at 227. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the recovery limitations violate equal 
protection. The court applied the minimum scrutiny, reasonable basis test and imposed the 
burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt on the plaintiffs. In finding 
that the recovery limits do not violate equal protection, the court stated: 
The statutory classification limiting the amounts recoverable 
against a public entity is based on real differences in fact between 
governmental and private tortfeasors. Public entities are 
responsible for providing a vast array of governmental services to 
the public and, as a result, are exposed to far greater liability and 
risks than a private individual. Moreover, the public entity, unlike 
the private individual, does not have the option of declaring 
bankruptcy or going out of business when subjected to tort 
liability, but rather must continue to carry out its responsibility to 
the public. 
* * * 
We have no hesitation in concluding that this statutory 
classification is reasonably related to the governmental objective 
of providing fiscal certainty in carrying out the manifold 
responsibilities of government. By limiting the liability of a public 
entity to a fixed amount, the Governmental Immunity Act protects 
the public entity against the risk that unforeseen and unlimited tort 
judgments will deplete the public coffers and result in the 
termination or substantial curtailment of important government 
functions. 
Id. at 227-28. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this same issue in Leliefeld v. Johnson. 659 P.2d 
111 (Ida. 1983). There, a truck driver and his wife filed suit against a second driver and the 
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State of Idaho to recover for injuries sustained in an accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
state was liable based upon the construction and design of the bridge where the accident 
occurred. At trial, the jury attributed fault of 10% to the plaintiff, 65% to the other driver and 
25% to the state. The jury found damages of $400,000 for plaintiff and $20,000 for plaintiffs 
wife. Subsequent to entry of the judgment, the state moved to have the judgment reduced to 
$100,000 pursuant to a statute limiting recovery against a governmental entity to $100,000 per 
person and $300,000 per occurrence. Id. at 126. In addressing the plaintiffs' equal protection 
argument, the court applied a rational basis test and stated: 
Although sparse, the legislative history indicates that the legislature 
was aware that they were establishing a classification and did so 
deliberately and not as a result of accident or ignorance. We deem 
it logical to infer from the legislative intent to enact the recovery 
limitation and the State's purported objective to protect the public 
coffers which the plaintiffs concede is a reasonably conceived 
objective that the recovery limitation has a rational basis. 
Id. at 128; see also, Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171. 661 P.2d 770 (Ida. App. 
1983)(followed Leliefeld in affirming trial court's reduction of judgment for wrongful death of 
five-year old child struck and killed by school bus from $212,500 to $100,000). 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the equal protection issue in Wilson v. Gipson. 
753 P.2d 1349 (Okl. 1988), in a case filed by the parents of five children who were killed and 
several other children who suffered serious injuries as a result of an explosion of a water heater 
at a public school. The insurance carrier for the school district tendered $300,000 to the trial 
court, the maximum amount recoverable from a governmental entity under Oklahoma statute. 
The trial court distributed funds for special damages and then divided the remainder equally, 
resulting in a distribution of approximately $18,000 to each family. The plaintiffs appealed, 
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asserting that the statute which limits recovery to $50,000 for injury to one person and 
$300,000 per occurrence is unconstitutional. The court, applying the rational basis test, 
concluded that the statute does not violate equal protection. In doing so, the court, like most 
of the courts in the cases cited above, stated that it is for the legislature, not the court, to 
determine the limits of a governmental entity's liability. Id. at 1353. 
Similarly, in Sambs v. Citv of Brookfield. 293 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1980), the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a statutory recovery limitation of $25,000 did not violate equal 
protection in a case where the plaintiff, who was rendered a paraplegic, was found to have 
damages of $949,645.66. After applying the rational basis test and finding the restriction 
constitutional, the court made this observation: 
We must acknowledge that the $25,000 statutory limitation 
appears low when considering this case which graphically 
illustrates the severity of physical injury which may be sustained 
by tort victims, the high costs of medical care, and the large 
amount of monetary damages awarded. The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court recently concluded 'that a $50,000 statutory 
limitation is precariously close to the boundary of acceptability' 
and urged the legislature, as we do, 'to review periodically all 
statutory limitations of recovery, including the one at issue here, 
to insure that inflation and political considerations do not lead to 
inequitable disparities in treatment.' 
Id. at510.n 
The following cases have all addressed equal protection challenges to governmental statutory recovery 
limitations and have found them to be constitutional: Caulev v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379 (Fla. 
1981)(applying rational basis test); Lienhardv. State. 431 N. W. 2d 861 (Minn. 1988)(applying rational basis test); 
Snyder v. Citv of Minneapolis. 441N. W. 2d 781 (Minn. 1989) (applying rational basis test); State v. Kallio. 557 P. 2d 
705 (Nev. 1976); Car2ill v. City of Rochester. 406 A. 2d 704 (N.H. 1979) (applying rational basis test): Hale v. Port 
ofPortland. 783 P. 2d 506, 516 (Or. 1989): Smith v. City of Philadelphia. 516A.2d306. 311 (Pa. 1986) (under both 
rational basis test and applying heightened scrutiny standard); and Stanhope v. Brown County. 280 N.W.2d 711, 
716 (Wis. 1979) (applying rational basis test). In all of our research, we have found only one case where a court 
reached the opposite result, Pfost v. State. 713 P. 2d 495 (Mont. 1985)(applying a heightened standard of review 
and requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to sustain the constitutionality of the statute because 
Montana's immunity act conflicted with the "open courts" provision because of a constitutional amendment in 1972 
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Courts have reached the same conclusion when addressing recovery limitations as applied 
to state hospitals and medical centers. In Sibley v. Board of Superiors. 462 So.2d 149 (La. 
1985), the plaintiff had been transferred from a private hospital to a University Medical Center. 
As a result of her treatment at the Medical Center, the plaintiff suffered massive brain damage, 
leaving her with the functional IQ of a 10-year old child. The plaintiff had a normal life 
expectancy, but would be unable to take care of herself. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs medical 
expenses exceeded $423,000. It was expected that a much greater amount would be required 
to meet her future long-term needs. 
At trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiff but the state's liability was limited to 
$500,000 pursuant to statute. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the liability limit was 
unconstitutional under the "open courts", equal protection, and due process clauses. In deciding 
the issue, the court first held that the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause. As a 
result, the court scrutinized the statute under "the lesser standard of rational basis [scrutiny]." 
Id. at 157. The court then concluded that the rational basis test was satisfied and that the 
liability cap did not "unconstitutionally violate either the equal protection or due process clauses 
of the state or federal constitutions . . . " Id. at 158. 
Other cases involving government hospitals have produced the same result. See Tarrant 
County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray. 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App. 1986) (statute limiting liability of 
that "fsjwept aside all notions of governmental immunity. " Id. at 499). However, the continuing validity of the 
decision in Pfost is in question because it was recently overruled to the extent it held that the "open courts" 
provision of the Montana Constitution (Article II, Section 16) guarantees a fundamental right. Meech v. Hillhaven 
West. Inc.. 776 P. 2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989). Because the court in Pfost applied a heightened standard of scrutiny 
and shifted the burden of proof to the state based upon Article II, Section 16, the conclusions reached by the court 
are in serious jeopardy. 
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county hospital to $100,000 does not violate equal protection); Neal v. Donahue. 611 P.2d 1125 
(Okla. 1980) (statute extending immunity to state hospital does not violate "open courts*1, equal 
protection, or due process); Crowe v. Harton Memorial Hosp.. 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. 
1979) (statute limiting the liability of a government hospital to $20,000 does not violate "open 
courts," equal protection, or due process); Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado. 586 P.2d 233 
(Colo. 1978) (statute limiting a person's ability to sue the University Hospital does not violate 
equal protection); Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan. 1977) (statute extending immunity 
to University Medical Center does not violate constitution); Malone v. University of Kansas 
Medical Center. 552 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute extending immunity to University Medical 
Center does not violate constitution). 
These cases illustrate that courts addressing recovery limitations have uniformly applied 
a rational basis test and found that the limitations are reasonably related to the purported purpose 
for the limitations. This Court should overrule Condemarin to the extent it applied a heightened 
standard of scrutiny and to the extent it shifted the burden of proof to the State. In addition, the 
Court should accord the recovery limitation set forth in §63-30-34 the normal presumption of 
constitutionality and apply the minimum standard of scrutiny. 
B. The Recovery Limitation is Reasonably Related to the Purposes for the Immunity 
Act. 
The Immunity Act as a whole, and the recovery limitation in particular, establish a 
classification consisting of those persons injured by a governmental entity but who have no 
remedy because there has been no waiver of governmental immunity as opposed to those who 
have been injured by a governmental entity by conduct for which immunity has been waived but 
whose recovery is limited by §63-30-34 and also consisting of those persons injured by the 
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conduct of private entities who have unrestricted recourse. The Court may be tempted to create 
more limited classifications, such as those referred to in Condemarin. i.e., the classification of 
victims of medical malpractice at private hospitals and the victims of medical malpractice at 
governmentally owned hospitals, such as the University Hospital (Justice Durham's opinion at 
353-54; Justice Stewart's opinion at 373). However, this narrow classification no longer exists 
because the 1987 amendments to the Immunity Act, which created a legislative definition of 
"governmental function", eliminates the argument that the Legislature selected governmentally-
owned hospitals from all entities of government for immunity for proprietary conduct. The 1987 
amendments eliminate what this Court perceived in Condemarin to be an attempt to treat 
governmentally-owned hospitals different from other entities of government and, accordingly, 
this Court must consider a much broader classification in reviewing the constitutionality of the 
1987 amendments to the Immunity Act. 
Through the 1987 amendments, the Legislature clearly determined that there is certain 
conduct for which governmental entities should be immune from liability and that there is other 
conduct for which governmental entities should not be immune but for which recovery should 
be limited. The legislative purpose, implicit from the Immunity Act itself, is to protect the 
public coffers from unforeseen and unexpected damage awards and to allow for fiscal certainty 
in carrying out the expanding responsibilities of government. Under the 1987 version of the 
Immunity Act, retaining immunity for some conduct and establishing recovery limitations for 
liability for which immunity is waived are reasonable and responsible means of achieving the 
legislative purposes and have a reasonable tendency to further those purposes. 
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Based on the Immunity Act, governmental entities can purchase liability insurance with 
nominal limits for known risks. Without the retained immunity and the recovery limits imposed 
by the Immunity Act, governmental entities would be forced to purchase insurance coverage with 
extraordinary limits to cover those rare situations where a tort victim's damages exceed the 
limits currently found in §63-30-34 or, in the alternative, go uninsured for such catastrophic 
losses. Both alternatives require the prudent governmental entity to shift expenditures from 
worthwhile programs and activities to provide either reserves against, or to pay insurance 
premiums to shift the risk of, a catastrophic loss. 
A limitation on recovery is the only rational way to serve the competing purposes of the 
Legislature's partial waiver of absolute governmental immunity. A fixed limit of liability at 
$250,000, subject to change by the Legislature as circumstances require, is Large enough to 
compensate most injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability, while 
simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk of insolvency or unfeasible tax 
burdens that would result from catastrophic judgments. The recovery limitation provides a 
crucial element of needed certainty. It supplies a fixed number on which to estimate future 
liability based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling governments to 
budget for the costs of self-insurance. In this way, it comprises a central part of the 
government's risk management program. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk 
management Requires that recovery be restricted at some finite level so that risk exposure can 
be projected and informed underwriting decisions can be made." Packard. 661 P.2d at 775. 
Without a fixed recovery limitation to cut off unlimited liability, there is no way to project future 
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losses realistically. In short, with no recovery limitation in place, budgeting for self-insurance 
and all other government expenditures could not be done with any tolerable level of certainty. 
The legislative history of 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130 clearly shows that the amount of 
Utah's current limit, far from being arbitrary, was reached through the difficult political process 
by compromises between competing interests. Utah's limitation is, in fact, $15,000 above the 
average of current statutory limits on governmental entity liability in states whose legislatures 
have similarly acted to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount.12 
Deciding whether to give up sovereign immunity and, if so, whether and where to draw 
the line of maximum recovery is not a judicial function. As numerous courts have pointed out, 
it is the role of the legislature, not the courts, 
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure to liability, the need 
to compensate citizens for injury, the availability of and cost of 
insurance, and the financial condition of the governmental units. 
It is the legislature's function to structure statutory provisions, 
which will protect the public interest in reimbursing the victim and 
in maintaining government services and which will be fair and 
reasonable to the victim and at the same time will be realistic 
regarding the financial burden to be placed on the taxpayers. 
12AUL Code §1 1-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-10-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 
10, §4012 (Supp. 1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000);Idaho Code §6-926 
(1984) ($500,000 per occurrence); III Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000); Ind. Code 
Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat. Ann. §75-6105 (1989) ($500,000per occurrence); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, §8105 (West 1964) ($300,000per occurrence); 
Md. Code Ann. §5-399.2 (Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258, 
§2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-15 (Supp. 
1991) ($25,000 until July 1,1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41.035 (Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-19 
(Michie 1989) ($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code §32.12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, §154 
(West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §8557 (1982) 
($500,000); R.I. Gen. Laws §9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000); S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex. 
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann. §893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991) 
($250,000); Wyo. Stat. §1-39-118 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000). 
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Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 514; accord Leliefeld, 659 P.2d at 129; Stanhope. 280 N.W.2d at 719. 
In short, it is not the province of the judiciary to second-guess elected officials' weighing of 
competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy questions underlying a partial 
waiver of absolute governmental immunity up to a fixed dollar amount. Sre Sambs. 293 
N.W.2d at 512; Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, CJ., dissenting). 
Finally, Section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it may preclude full recovery 
by some. Any recovery limitation will do so, precisely because it is intended to do so. A limit 
high enough not to exclude any injured party from full recovery would, in fact, be no limit at 
all. In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a statutory liability limit for injuries arising 
from operation of nuclear power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity, be arbitrary 
in the sense that any choice of a figure based on imponderables 
like those at issue here can always be so characterized. This is 
not, however, the kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise 
constitutional action. 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study. 438 U.S. 59, 86 (1978). 
For these reasons, it is clear that the retention of immunity and the recovery limitation 
both have a reasonable tendency to further the statutory objectives of the Immunity Act and, as 
a result, The Immunity Act and the recovery limitations set forth §63-30-34 should not be found 
unconstitutional under either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
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VI. THE PROVISION LIMITING DAMAGES FROM STATE-OWNED 
HOSPITALS TO $250.000 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
In their respective due process analysis in Condemarin. both Justice Durham and Justice 
Zimmerman applied a constitutional analysis based upon a combination of the "open courts" 
provision, Article I, Section 11, and Article I, Section 7. Because, as set forth above, the "open 
courts" provision is not applicable to governmental immunity, the hybrid due process analysis 
incorporating both constitutional provisions is inappropriate, and the traditional due process 
analysis must be applied. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
The traditional substantive due process test is very similar to the minimum scrutiny 
standard applied to equal protection analysis. 
If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a 
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied . . . 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); see also, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins. 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980). 
The United States Supreme Court previously addressed a substantive due process 
challenge to legislation limiting recovery from private entities engaged in the production of 
nuclear energy in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study. 438 U.S. 59, 98 (1978). There, 
the Court concluded that the limitation provision was a classic example of economic regulation, 
applied the general presumption of constitutionality, imposed the burden of proof on the party 
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challenging the statute, and found that the limitation provision was reasonably related to a 
legitimate purpose. Id. 438 U.S. at 83-84. 
In this case, for the reasons stated in Section V above, the recovery limitation of the 
Immunity Act is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, and as a result, this Court should 
find that it does not violate the right to due process provided under both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. See, Wilson v. Gipson. 753 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Okl. 1988) and Hale v. Port 
of Portland. 783 P.2d 506, 517 (Or. 1989) (both rejecting due process challenge to recovery 
limitation in governmental immunity statutes). 
VDL PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE IMMUNITY ACT IS 
CLEARLY AND PALPABLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Plaintiffs' entire argument concerning the 1987 version of the Immunity Act is based on 
this Court's decision in Condemarin and the mistaken belief that this Court addressed the 1987 
version of the Immunity Act in Condemarin. However, this Court did not address the 1987 
version of the Immunity Act in Condemarin. and Condemarin should be reversed for the reasons 
set forth above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of proof because the 1987 
version of the Immunity Act is constitutional and must be enforced by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
At common law, state entities, such as the University Hospital, were immune from all 
tort liability arising from both proprietary and governmental functions. The distinctions made 
at common law between state entities, municipalities and private corporations were uniformly 
recognized by this Court and were never held to be unconstitutional. The 1987 version of the 
Immunity Act retains immunity for state entities for many acts. However, the Immunity Act 
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also waives immunity for many acts, but limits recovery in those circumstances. The 
Legislature could have constitutionally retained governmental immunity, thereby precluding 
Plaintiffs from any and all recovery from the University Hospital. The Legislature cannot have 
acted unconstitutionally by providing Plaintiffs a remedy they did not enjoy at common law and 
by simply limiting the available recovery. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should find the $250,000 recovery limitation 
provision of the 1987 version of the Immunity Act constitutional. Based upon this finding, the 
Court should rule that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Defendants for recommending that 
they settle their claims against the University Hospital for $250,000. 
DATED this 2^^ day of September, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
ARTICLE I 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ADDENDUM 2 
63-30-2. Definitions • 
As used in this chapter: 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions 
as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the 
act, failure to act, operation, function , or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or 
governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private 
persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by 
any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a 
governmental entity. 
* * * 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school 
district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
* * * 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, 
department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursinghome, or other governmental health care facility, and 
from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune 
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental entity or employee. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages 
for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a 
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person 
in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one 
occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as 
governmental. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HIPWELL, SHELLY 
VS 
SHARP, ROGER T 
HEALY, TIM W 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910905017 CV 
DATE 03/30/92 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND AFTER HAVING HEARD ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
COURT HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT, RULES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED, 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA TM OPPOSITION 
THERETO. 
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
3. THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS PIVOTAL AND DISPOSITIVE. 
THIS COURT WOULD URGE DEFENDANTS TO PURSUE AN INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS. 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (£0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718) 
GARY RHYS JOHNSON, Esq. (T?5729) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111 
(801) 355-6677 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an 
individual by and through 
her guardians, SHERRY 
JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, 
and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910905017 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roger T. 
Sharp and Tim W. Healy came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled court on March 30, 1992 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. 
Defendant Sharp appeared by and through his counsel of record, 
Glenn C. Hanni and Strong & Hanni and Defendant Healy appeared 
by and through his counsel of record, Thomas L. Kay of Snell & 
Wilmer. Plaintiff appeared by and through her counsel of 
record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon 
Forgette. 
The court, having reviewed the respective motions, 
supporting and opposing memoranda, having heard oral argument, 
and being fully apprised in this matter, 
HEREBY ORDERS that the Motions for Summary Judgment are 
hereby denied. 
DATED this /fl^day of^ cfrc?hr; 1992. 
BY'THE COURT: 
DENNIS FREDERICK 
CT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
STR(^^5^>IANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni 
A t t o r n e y s fo r De fendan t S h a r p 
SNELL & WILMER 
^ e m ^ ^ . 
Thomas L. Ka^ 
Attorneys for Defendant Healy 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Regular May Term, 1992 June 23, 1992 
Shelly Hipwell, an individual 
by and through her guardians, 
Sherrie Jensen and Shayne 
Hipwell, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. No. 920218 
Roger Sharp, Tim W. Healy, 910905017CV 
and Does I through X, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having 
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal 
be, and the same is, granted as prayed. 
